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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN: DID INVESTORS SLIP THROUGH THE HOLES IN
SOX?

I. INTRODUCTION
When President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, he
announced “with a tough new law we will act against those who have shaken
confidence in our markets, using the full authority of government to expose
corruption, punish wrongdoers and defend the rights and interests of American
workers and investors.”1 As the effects of the current economic downturn
reverberate throughout the United States and around the world, consumers and
investors look forward for signs that the crisis has reached its bottom point.
Identifying the factors that contributed to the crisis is of similar importance
because then policymakers can take steps to mitigate the risk of recurrence and
identify whether market participants were exposed to disproportionate risk.
The burst of the housing bubble and the rapid decline in the value of
mortgage-backed securities have been identified as a trigger of the current
economic crisis.2 Economic indicators in the mortgage industry have declined
tremendously from the record number of homes that have entered foreclosure,3
investment banks have recorded staggering losses and reduced their
workforces in response to the decline,4 and home prices have declined
nationwide.5 However, the impact of the mortgage meltdown extends beyond
the mortgage industry. By January 2009, over 2.5 million people lost their
1. MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: COSTS, BENEFITS AND BUSINESS
IMPACT 5 (2008).
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See Vikas Bajaj, Foreclosures Rose as Delinquencies Eased in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2008, at B8 (showing that in June 2008, 2.75 percent or approximately 1.75 million
homes were in foreclosure, the highest rate recorded since such data began being recorded in
1979).
4. See Press Release, Citigroup Inc, Citi Reports Third Quarter Net Loss of $2.8 Billion,
Loss Per Share of $0.60, (Oct. 16, 2008), available at www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2008/
081016a.htm (explaining Citigroup recognized a loss of $2.8 billion for the 3rd quarter of 2008
and reduced its head count by 23,000 during the first nine months of 2008).
5. See Michael M. Grynbaum, House Sales Rise, But the Prices Are Lower, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/business/26econ.html
(explaining that in July 2008 home prices fell 7.1% from July 2007. Though the number of
homes sold in July 2008 increased, the increase was the result of depressed prices triggered by
foreclosures and owners forced to sell at bargain prices because of the lack of selling
opportunities (i.e. “distress sales”), the sales contributed to continued declining home prices).
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jobs across various industries since the United States entered a recession in
2007.6 As a result of this job-loss, the lives of many Americans and people
across the world have been affected.7
The billions of dollars in financial statement write-downs taken by
investment banks and the resulting investor shock and market decline conjure
memories of the corporate scandals and economic downturn the United States
faced at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These scandals motivated
President Bush to sign the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) into law.8
SOX was intended to improve investor confidence in the market by increasing
the quality of disclosures made to investors and enhancing management’s
responsibility for financial statements.9 SOX has remained exceedingly
controversial due to the staggering costs it places on businesses subject to the
regulation.10
Subprime lending by investment banks contributed to the mortgage
meltdown that has sent the economy into a downward spiral.11 The question
arises whether there was an opportunity for SOX to mitigate the risk posed by
the mortgage-related activities of investment banks or whether the events
precipitating the current crisis were beyond the scope of SOX. This paper will
first explore the events that motivated the passage of SOX, Enron’s activities
leading to its collapse in 2001, and the resulting reforms SOX instituted. The
current economic crisis will be investigated next, and finally the role of SOX
and investment banks within the mortgage crisis will be considered.
This paper finds SOX was applicable to the investment bank’s financial
reporting of its mortgage-related activities. The financial statement accounts
reflecting the investment bank’s mortgage-related activity should have been
identified as “significant,” triggering extensive SOX requirements concerning
management’s responsibility for establishing and assessing internal controls to
address valuation and disclosure in financial statements.
II. INVESTOR OUTRAGE RESULTS IN SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Several factors led to the rapid and overwhelming congressional support of
SOX in 2002. President Bush referred to SOX as “the most far-reaching
6. Jack Healy, 62,000 Jobs Are Cut by U.S. and Foreign Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/business/economy/27jobcuts.html.
7. See Matthew Saltmarsh, Britain and Spain Show More Signs of a Slowdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B2 (stating that in January 2009, Britain entered into recession, and
Spain had its highest unemployment rate in more than 8 years).
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
10. Large multinational companies can spend between $1 and $10 million and smaller
companies can spend between $250,000 and $500,000 for SOX compliance. HOLT, supra note 1,
at 13.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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reform of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.”12 SOX was preceded by a stock market tumble that began in 2001.
Prior to this decline, investor confidence followed the market’s consistent
upward trend.13 As various corporate scandals became public,14 and both the
dot-com and telecom “bubbles” burst, market and investor confidence sharply
declined in 2001.15 As 2001 closed, the three major U.S. indices had each lost
significant value for the year as the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined 7.1
percent, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost 13 percent, and the Nasdaq
Composite fell 21.1 percent.16 This resulted in a congressional “regulatory
panic”17 aimed at restoring the very low investor confidence triggered by
corporate scandals and the declining stock market.18
A.

Corporate Scandals and Dot-Com and Telecom Bubbles Burst

Prior to the passage of SOX, corporate scandals adversely affected the
stock market and battered investors as corporations restated earnings and
wrote-down assets in stunning amounts.19 The scandals that preceded SOX
included Enron, which took a $500 million accounting loss, reduced
shareholder equity by $1.2 billion as the result of off-balance sheet debt, and
ultimately declared bankruptcy in 2001.20 WorldCom also announced in 2002
it had overstated earnings by $3.8 billion through improperly capitalized
expenses and recognized $3 billion of revenue it should have expensed.21
Concurrent with the fallout from Enron, the dot-com bubble burst after the
tremendous growth of internet-based businesses in the 1980s and 1990s
spurred by venture capital firms.22 Most of these dot-com companies
ultimately went out of business in what became an intensely competitive

12. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 9 (2006).
13. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2003) (describing the corporate governance issues that came to light from November
2001 through November 2002).
14. SANJAY ANAND, ESSENTIALS OF SARBANES-OXLEY 3–5 (2007).
15. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 7–8.
16. Floyd Norris, The Markets: Stocks and Bonds; After Two-Year Drop in Markets,
Calendar Turns on Note of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2002/01/01/business/markets-stocks-bonds-after-two-year-drop-markets-calendarturns-note-hope.html?scp=1&sq=Drop+in+Markets&st=nyt.
17. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7.
18. Id. at 30.
19. See Thomas G. Bost, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Summary, 7 PERSP. ON LEGIS.,
REG., & LITIG. 1, 2–4 (2003).
20. Hamilton, supra note13, at 10–11.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 13.
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market.23 The telecommunications industry also grew rapidly during the
1990s, as companies installed fiber-optic networks for what was expected to be
tremendous growth in electronic communication.24 The telecom bubble burst
as demand failed to keep pace with the tremendous capacity created, causing
investment interests to dry up, billions of dollars to be lost and many
companies to restate earnings.25
As these circumstances drove both market and investor confidence down,
Congress was motivated to quickly pass the sweeping regulations known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In April 2002, several months after Enron’s
bankruptcy,26 Congressman Michael Oxley introduced the Corporate and
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act while Senator
Paul Sarbanes introduced Senate Bill 2673.27 Because Congressman Oxley’s
proposed Act was “more moderate,” Senator Sarbanes’ more expansive
proposal gained support as WorldCom announced its first earnings restatement
of $3.85 billion.28 What started as two proposals in April 2002 was passed
though the House of Representatives with a vote of 423 in favor versus three
opposed, and was unanimously approved by the Senate. President Bush signed
Sarbanes-Oxley into law on July 30, 2002.29
Corporate fraud triggered outrage by the public, investors, and regulators,
and ultimately resulted in resounding support for the passage of SOX. The
overwhelming support was also the result of Congress’ belief that serious
economic consequences could result if investor confidence was not
improved.30 The concern loomed that, as investor trust in the market and
publically traded companies declined, investors would become less willing to
invest in the U.S. markets, resulting in heightened risks of market seizure and
potential recession.31 It was in this panicked environment that SOX became
law.
B.

Enron Debacle Provides Reference Point for Analyzing the Mortgage
Meltdown

Enron has emerged as an infamous example of the accounting and
financial scandals that marked the tumultuous economic downturn in the early
part of the twenty-first century. A review of the events leading to Enron’s

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 13–14.
Hamilton, supra note 13, at 16–17.
GREGORY J. JENKINS, THE ENRON COLLAPSE 8 (2003).
ANAND, supra note 14, at 9–10.
Bost, supra note 19, at 5.
ANAND, supra note 14, at 10.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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collapse facilitates understanding the aim of SOX and provides a reference
point for analyzing the current market downturn and investor outrage.
Enron began operating in 1985 with an initial focus on the transportation
of natural gas.32 As Enron spent billions of dollars to expand worldwide, it
shifted from merely operating a gas utility toward activity in the unregulated
energy trading markets.33 Enron predicted this trading activity would be more
profitable than engaging in a more traditional business model and owning
physical assets.34 Before becoming the quintessential example of corporate
governance failure, Enron’s business methods appeared to be successful. It
became the seventh largest company in the United States35 and was repeatedly
ranked by Fortune as the most innovative company in America.36 The
company went from reporting revenues of approximately $9 billion dollars in
1995 to $101 billion in 2000, and the stock price grew from approximately $20
in 1997 to almost $90 in 2000.37 However, the basis for its stock price was
unfounded. Inflated asset values and understated liabilities drove its stock
price up, while, in reality, the company was moving toward bankruptcy.38
Enron was holding $1.2 billion in recourse debt that was invisible to investors
because it was not consolidated onto Enron’s balance sheet and was otherwise
undisclosed in the financial statements.39
One significant tactic Enron used to mislead investors was its aggressive
and deceptive use of special purpose entities (“SPEs”).40 An SPE allows a
company to create a “separate, independently controlled entity, with a portion
of the ownership separate from the main company’s ownership,” resulting in
the risk exposure of the SPE being carried separate from the main company.41
When properly structured, an SPE allows a company to pursue potentially
risky projects without requiring the main company to consolidate the SPE onto
the balance sheet of the main company.42

32. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
33. Id.
34. Id. (activities included “buying and selling financial contracts linked to the value of
energy assets.”).
35. ANAND, supra note 14, at 4.
36. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 8.
37. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 4–5.
38. Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON, CORPORATE
FIASCOS, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 63, 64 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
39. Id. at 66.
40. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 13–14 (explaining how these accounting practices
themselves are commonly used and their deceptive potential comes from how businesses choose
to utilize them).
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

278

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:273

Enron’s accounting treatment of its SPEs was improper because, while it
did not consolidate its SPEs onto its balance sheet, Enron failed to qualify for
this preferential accounting treatment. Many of Enron’s SPEs did not maintain
the requisite 3% of independent ownership, and Enron was exposed to
substantial risk from the SPE’s operations because Enron made guarantees
related to the SPE’s obligations.43 As a result, although Enron should have
consolidated the associated debt onto its consolidated balance sheet,44 it failed
to do so.45 Enron announced on October 16, 2001 that in order to revise its
accounting for SPEs, it was taking a half a billion-dollar charge against its
earnings and reducing its equity by $1.2 billion.46 Less than two weeks
following Enron’s earnings announcement, its stock declined in value by more
than 54%.47 Enron also announced that it would have to make astronomical
restatements of its earnings and significantly increase its consolidated debt
from 1997 through the first two quarters of 2001 because of previously
unconsolidated entities.48 Prior to Enron, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”) required disclosures concerning related-party
transactions, but Enron failed to disclose to investors in sufficient detail the
structure of its SPEs.49 This left investors in the dark on Enron’s risk exposure
until the SPE deals soured and triggered Enron’s responsibility for the SPE’s
obligations.50 Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.51
There was an even more startling aspect of the Enron saga beyond the
extent of fraud perpetrated. Enron’s Board of Directors owed a fiduciary duty
to Enron’s shareholders.52 Enron’s lawyers owed a duty to the corporation.53
Enron’s public accountants owed a duty to the public.54 All failed to either
detect the fraud or blow the whistle.55 As discussed below, SOX attempted to
respond to the triggers of the financial debacles of the time, including Enron.

43. Id. (stating that in many cases Enron’s Chief Financial Officer controlled the
partnerships comprising the 3% of independent ownership).
44. Id.
45. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 14.
46. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7.
47. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 7.
48. Reductions to net income were equivalent to “reductions in reported earnings of 91% in
1997, 16% in 1998, 28% in 1999 and 13% in 2000.” Id. at 7–8.
49. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 15.
50. Bethany McLean, Enron All Over Again, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 76, available at
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/26/101232905/index.htm.
51. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 8.
52. Janger, supra note 38, at 66.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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C. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Provisions
The self-proclaimed purpose of SOX is “[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.”56 SOX
attempted to establish comprehensive reform measures by establishing the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), addressed auditor
independence, corporate responsibility, and enhanced financial disclosures.57
SOX is applicable to companies that are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and it amended several established laws and also
established new regulations.58
SOX established the PCAOB to vest an organization with responsibility to
oversee the audit of public companies, protect investors and address the
preparation of audit reports.59 The PCAOB’s authority includes setting quality
control and independence standards,60 conducting compliance inspections of
registered public accounting firms,61 and pronouncing audit standards.62 The
creation of the PCAOB subjected the previously self-regulated public
accounting industry to an independent regulatory body.63 SOX attempted to
increase auditor independence from the client by mandating audit partner
rotation64 and requiring periodic reports by the auditor to the audit committee
of the company’s board of directors.65 Auditor independence was further

56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
57. § 1, 116 Stat. at 745–46. Other areas addressed by SOX include restrictions based on
analyst conflicts of interest, mandating the conduction of various studies and reports, and
addressing penalties for corporate and criminal fraud.
58. GUY LANDER, WHAT IS SARBANES OXLEY? 1–2 (2004).
59. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board states the
following as its mission: “The PCAOB is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation, created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect the
interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, and
independent audit reports.” Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Oversees the Auditors
of Public Companies to Protect Investors, http://pcaob.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
60. § 103, 116 Stat. 745, 755–57.
61. § 104, 116 Stat. at 757–59.
62. § 103, 116 Stat. at 755–57. For example, the PCAOB pronounced Auditing Standard
No. 5 – An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with An Audit
of Financial Statements. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD 434 (2010), available at http://pcaobus.org/
Rules/PCAOBRules/Documents/All.pdf.
63. See JENKINS, supra note 26, at 18. SOX made it unlawful for any person who is not
registered with the PCAOB to issue an audit report for an issuer. § 102, 116 Stat. at 753.
64. § 203, 116 Stat. at 773.
65. § 204, 116 Stat. at 773.
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addressed by specifying non-audit services that a registered public accounting
firm is prohibited from providing to audit clients.66
SOX also addressed the role of the audit committee by stipulating that the
committee is “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and
oversight of the work” of the company’s auditor.67 The company’s audit
committee members are to be independent of the company, and the only
compensation members may receive is based on participation on the audit
committee.68 This committee is also vested with the responsibility for
establishing procedures to receive and address complaints concerning the
company’s accounting, internal control, and auditing activities.69 The audit
committee is also empowered to hire independent counsel and advisors as
necessary to assist in carrying out its responsibilities.70
SOX attempted to increase management’s responsibility for financial
statements and how information consolidated into financial statements is
identified and reported. Both the “principal” executive and financial officers
are required to make certifications concerning how the company’s condition is
presented in the annual and quarterly reports.71 Both officers are required to
attest to reviewing the annual or quarterly report, that “based on the officer’s
knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not
misleading,” and that the reports “fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations . . . .”72 Requiring the officer’s
certification (based upon the officer’s knowledge) holds both officers
personally responsible for the annual and quarterly reports to prevent
delegation of responsibility for financial statements.73
The “principal” executive and financial officers are also charged with
responsibility concerning the company’s internal control environment. Each
annual and quarterly report must include an acknowledgement by the
“principal” executive and financial officers’ of their responsibility for
designing controls to ensure that the company’s material information is known
to the officers.74 Management is also required to make an assessment of the

66. § 201, 116 Stat. at 771–72. Prohibited non-audit services include bookkeeping,
“financial information systems design and implementation,” appraisals, actuarial services,
internal audit, management or human resources, investment advisor, legal services and other
services found by the Board of Directors to be impermissible.
67. § 301, 116 Stat. at 777.
68. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777.
72. Id.
73. Bost, supra note 19, at 32.
74. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777.
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internal controls and include a report on the assessment in the company’s
annual and quarterly reports.75 The report includes management’s statement of
responsibility to establish and maintain “an adequate internal control structure
and procedures for financial reporting” and an assessment of the “effectiveness
of the internal control structure and procedures” for financial reporting.76 SOX
also requires these officers to report to both the auditor and audit committee all
significant internal control deficiencies that could adversely affect the
company’s ability to report financial data and detect management fraud.77
The criminal penalties for failure to comply with SOX indicate the
seriousness of Congress’ message in passing SOX. Penalties for a certified
report’s failure to comply with SOX can include 10 years imprisonment, fines
of up to $1 million, or both.78 A certifying officer who willfully certifies a
statement knowing the statement does not comply with SOX can be penalized
with up to 20 years imprisonment, fines of up to $5 million, or both.79
SOX attempted to improve financial statement disclosures by several
mechanisms.
SOX requires disclosure of material “off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, and obligations” and other relationships with
unconsolidated entities or persons that may have a “material current or future
effect” on the company’s financial condition.80 SOX also requires that pro
forma financial information be presented free from untrue material facts and
free from omissions of material facts necessary to ensure the pro forma data
are not misleading.81 SOX also enhanced the role of the auditor by explicitly
requiring the financial statements to reflect “all material correcting
adjustments” identified by the external auditor.82
SOX furthermore addressed disclosures concerning the company’s
corporate governance structure. A company must disclose whether it has
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers and, if not, must explain
why no such code has been adopted.83 Finally, a company is directed to
disclose whether the audit committee includes at least one member who is a
“financial expert” and, if not, explain the reason for the absence.84
75. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789.
76. Id. SOX increases the spotlight placed on internal controls and information publically
available by also requiring the external auditor to express an opinion on management’s
assessment of the company’s internal controls. Id.
77. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777.
78. § 906, 116 Stat. at 806.
79. Id.
80. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785–87.
81. § 401, 116 Stat. at 786.
82. Id.
83. § 406, 116 Stat. at 789.
84. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790. In determining whether one is a “financial expert,” factors
considered include education and work experience (including roles such as public accountant,
auditor and principal financial officer), an understanding of generally accepted accounting
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The overriding goals of SOX include improving information provided to
investors by enhancing the integrity, accuracy, and accountability of financial
statements.85 These goals are aimed at improving and maintaining the trust of
investors by increasing the standards in both a moral and professional
capacity.86 The integrity and accuracy of financial statements are addressed in
SOX through its requirements concerning the establishment, maintenance and
assessment of a company’s internal control structure.87 The integrity of
financial statements is to be improved by installing internal control
requirements geared to ensure all relevant financial information is presented,
while stripping the financial statements of fraudulent reporting.88 The
accuracy of financial statements is to be improved by imposing an internal
control system that is capable of preventing and detecting misleading business
practices.89 These provisions can be linked to Enron’s financial statements,
which lacked integrity and accuracy since they did not adequately disclose the
nature of its relationship with SPEs and failed to consolidate SPE debt onto its
balance sheet.90 Enron’s use of pro form reports also contributed to its
misrepresentation by characterizing various billion dollar charges as “nonrecurring,” allowing it to present pro forma financial data as if the charges had
not been incurred.91 Investigations into Enron’s corporate governance system
identified weakness or absence of internal controls as a source of its failure.92
SOX attempted to improve the accountability of corporate executives for
financial statements by removing the “faceless corporation” as a refuge for
inadequate financial reporting.93 SOX expressly communicates, to both the
company and the public, which executives are responsible for information
presented in financial statements.94 With Enron, there was not a single
individual or a group who could officially be designated as responsible for
assuring implementation of internal controls over financial reporting.95 SOX
addressed this opportunity for blame shifting by requiring a specific person be
identified who is accountable for shortcomings of the financial statements.

principles and financial statements, experience in preparing or auditing financial statements,
experience with accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves, internal controls experience and
an understanding of the audit committee functions.
85. ANAND, supra note 14, at 28.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 29.
88. See id. at 23–24.
89. Id. at 24–25.
90. Janger, supra note 38, at 66.
91. See Van Niel, supra note 32, at 15.
92. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 18.
93. ANAND, supra note 14, at 24–25.
94. Id.
95. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 19.
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SOX provisions changed the requirements for corporate governance. The
responsibilities of executive officers, the board of directors, and accounting
firms were revised and enhanced.96 Commentators have questioned whether
SOX was the best response to prevent the repetition of the corporate fraud that
plagued the beginning of the twenty-first century.97 The current economic
crisis and the role of the investment banks within the crisis provide an
opportunity to assess whether SOX was an effective response.
III. SUBPRIME LENDING LEADS TO ECONOMIC CRISIS
Many factors have contributed to the recession the United States entered in
December 2007. Since entering the recession, the United States has sustained
a staggering amount of job losses,98 the stock market has wildly fluctuated and
lost value,99 a substantial number of mortgages have gone into foreclosure,100
and investment banks have taken billions of dollars in losses.101 Though the
understanding of the causes underlying the economic downturn continues to be
refined, it is clear that losses on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities
played a pivotal role in the credit crisis that has exacerbated the situation.102
The following discussion of the role of mortgage-related activities in the
economic downturn introduces the evolution of the complex mortgage
industry, the events which precipitated the current mortgage meltdown, and
how the housing decline triggered substantial investment bank losses.
A.

Evolution of the Complex Mortgage Industry

The mortgage industry has evolved into a very complex market that
ultimately contributed to the difficulty of assessing the risk of mortgagebacked securities. Traditionally, the issuance of a home mortgage was a
transaction that occurred primarily between the borrower and a local lender
who recorded the loan on the lender’s books.103 The industry began to grow
more complex during the 1970s, when government-sponsored entities began

96. LANDER, supra note 58, at 1.
97. See generally Postings of Larry E. Ribstein to Ideoblog: Sarbanes-Oxley, http://bus
movie.typepad.com/ideoblog/sarbanesoxley/.
98. Healy, supra note 6.
99. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2008, at A1.
100. Thomas Killian, Surviving the 2007 Financial Crisis, U.S. BANKER, Mar. 2008, at 40.
101. Sorkin, supra note 99.
102. See generally Michael Krimminger, “It’s Alive!”—Mortgage Risk Reborn: Issues and
Possible Solutions, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 259 (2008); Sally
Pittman, ARMS, But No Legs to Stand On: “Subprime” Solutions Plague the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1089 (2008); Nomi Prins, The Risk Fallacy, FORTUNE, Nov. 10,
2008, at 112.
103. Prins, supra note 102, at 114.
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purchasing mortgages from local lenders, removing the loans from the lenders’
books and clustering them into “mortgage-backed securities.”104 The arrival of
mortgage-backed securities resulted in a fundamental shift in the operation of
the mortgage market because the local lender no longer bore the risk of
mortgage default as the lender shifted the default risk to the holders of
mortgage-backed securities.105
The variety of mortgage products available has also evolved over time,
becoming more complex, and making it more difficult to predict the risk of
borrower default.106 The two primary kinds of mortgages are a fixed-rate
mortgage (“FRM”) and adjustable-rate mortgage (“ARM”).107 The interest
rate and payment amount of a FRM are fixed and do not fluctuate over time.108
In contrast, the interest rate and payments of an ARM vary and can fluctuate
greatly because payment is determined by reference to an index.109
Subprime borrowers are individuals with “a high debt-to-income ratio, an
impaired or minimal credit history,” or have other characteristics suggesting a
higher probability of default than a prime borrower.110 Subprime mortgages
are typically offered an interest rate higher than a prime mortgage rate.111
Many subprime mortgages begin with a starter rate that resets after twenty-four
or thirty-six months.112 Once the subprime mortgage’s low initial fixed rate
expires, the rate becomes variable and monthly payments are likely to
increase.113
B.

Popularity of Subprime Lending Increases Due to Reduced Interest Rates
and Securitization of Mortgages

The subprime lending market has operated since the early 1980s but
experienced an increased rate of growth during the mid-1990s and grew
exponentially during the early part of the twenty-first century.114 For example,
$120 billion of subprime loans were originated during 2001, while over $600

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. New mortgages introduced included balloon mortgages, adjustable rate mortgages,
and floating rate mortgages.
107. Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer, in THE
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: WHO, WHAT, WHERE AND WHY … INVESTIGATIONS &
LITIGATION 89, 93 (Keith W. Miller ed., 2007).
108. Id.
109. Id. ARM payments can adjust monthly, semiannually, or annually.
110. Id. at 92. Prime mortgages are typically the mortgages offered to borrowers with good
credit.
111. Id.
112. Krimminger, supra note 102, at 261.
113. Id.
114. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 91.
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billion in subprime loans were originated during 2006.115 This growth was
spurred by several factors, including the reduction of interest rates during 2001
and 2002 and mortgage securitization.116
1. Reduced Interest Rates Lead to Increased Subprime Lending
The market decline in 2001 and 2002 triggered the significant reduction in
interest rates and resulted in the prime mortgage market becoming highly
saturated.117 As a result of the market saturation, lenders sought to issue more
mortgages and turned to riskier subprime borrowers.118 Lenders were
motivated to continue issuing mortgages by the opportunities to generate
profits through mortgage securitization.119 The growth in the subprime market
was further enhanced by the questionable underwriting practices of some
lenders. Such practices included issuing mortgages based solely on the
borrower’s stated income, requiring little or no documentation.120 Some
lenders offered hybrid mortgages and approved borrowers based on their
ability to pay the minimum mortgage payments, without consideration of the
borrower’s ability to pay the higher payments required once the mortgage
transitioned into an ARM.121 The liquidity available to lenders through the
securitization process provided an incentive for lenders to issue riskier
mortgages without the tempering effect of the lender bearing the risk of
default.122
2. Mortgage Securitization Further Increases the Popularity of Subprime
Lending
The mechanisms and parties involved with securitizing mortgages are
complex, and as such, the following is intended to present an overview of the
process to assist in understanding the current crisis and role of investment
banks. The securitization process begins with the lender issuing a loan to a
borrower. In many cases, the lender will then sell its rights to collect the
mortgage payments to a trust or special purpose entity (SPE)123 that the lender
has created.124 The SPE effectively becomes the owner of the loans and

115. Id. at 93.
116. Pittman, supra note 102, at 1097 (discussing the events causing the expansion of
subprime lending).
117. Prins, supra note 102, at 116.
118. Id.
119. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Sex, Lies, and Mortgage Deals, BUS. WK., Nov. 28, 2008, at
70.
120. Krimminger, supra note 102, at 262.
121. See id. at 262–63.
122. Id. at 263.
123. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 71.
124. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 95–96.
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underwrites the mortgage-backed securities.125 Mortgage-backed securities are
created by grouping subprime mortgages and other assets together and then
dividing the group into sections, or “tranches,” based upon the likelihood of
default.126 After the securities have been underwritten, either the underwriter
or an investment bank purchases the securities from the trust and then conveys
the securities to investors.127
Repurchase agreements are one source of bankruptcy risk for lenders.
Lenders often enter into repurchase agreements with the mortgage purchasers,
stipulating that the lender will repurchase the subprime loans if default rates of
the underlying loans reach a specified threshold.128 Lenders are to fund
reserves to service these potential repurchases.129 Bankruptcy can result when
lenders do not properly reserve for their repurchase requirements.130
The securitization of subprime loans significantly increased in 2003.
Investment banks were the catalyst for the growth of subprime mortgages as
they purchased and securitized tremendous numbers of loans.131 In 2006, the
top ten investment banks sold mortgage-backed securities worth $1.5 trillion, a
dramatic increase from the $245 billion of mortgage-backed securities sold in
2000.132 Investment banks further increased their participation by purchasing
mortgage wholesaling firms, extending billions of dollars in credit to subprime
lenders, and even purchasing subprime lenders.133
Mortgage securitization was considered a risk reducing activity because
the risk of default would be widely spread across many investors.134 However,
as banks also created more complex mortgages and new, increasingly complex
securities, it became more difficult for investors to assess the risk of default for
the underlying assets.135 Meanwhile, the potentially crippling economic
impact that could result from the widespread default of subprime mortgages
was compounded by several other factors. Financial institutions used
mortgage-backed securities as collateral to borrow more money, which further
extended the reach of subprime mortgage-backed securities into the
economy.136 Additionally, beginning in 2004, the Securities and Exchange
125. Id. at 96.
126. Prins, supra note 102, at 114.
127. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 96.
128. Id. at 97.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Der Hovanesian, supra note 119, at 70.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Prins, supra note 102, at 114.
135. Id. Rating agencies assigned grades to different tranches based on computer models that
many believe did not accurately assess the risk of the securities, resulting in high ratings to
securities that in fact carried a high degree of risk.
136. Id. at 116.
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Commission permitted investment banks to carry $30 in debt for each $1 in
equity.137 This degree of leverage became unmanageable when the market was
no longer willing to buy the mortgage-backed securities that provided the
collateral for the debt.138
The purchasers of mortgage-backed securities further extended the risk
underlying subprime mortgages into the greater economy as investors in
mortgage-backed securities came to include “individuals, hedge funds and
companies.”139 The extension of this risk to the greater economy had rippling
effects that extended beyond defaulting homeowners and purchasers of
mortgage-backed securities, and ultimately triggered significant losses for
investment banks and the loss of jobs in many industries.
C. The Housing Decline Triggers Investment Bank Losses
Though the housing bubble led to tremendous opportunities for subprime
borrowers to achieve home ownership, the bubble’s burst had staggering
effects on those same subprime borrowers and ultimately the economy at large.
Home values consistently increased until 2006, when prices began to fall.140
During the period of soaring home values (and increasing subprime lending),
borrowers facing an ARM resetting to a higher payment could avoid
delinquency by either refinancing their mortgage or selling their house.141
When the housing market turned, subprime borrowers facing adjusting ARM
payments found that home values were falling and existing home sales were
declining.142 Those who were unable to refinance their mortgage or sell their
home were left with little alternative to default.143 These defaults negatively
impacted investors in mortgage-backed securities as the securities lost value in
response to increasing defaults.144
Mortgage loan deficiencies approached 10-year highs in 2007, and for the
first time since the Great Depression, median home prices declined across the
nation.145 Once losses in subprime mortgage-backed securities started to
occur, investors retracted from mortgage-backed securities and other types of
complex securitized products, including investments that had traditionally been

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Pittman, supra note 102, at 1102.
Krimminger, supra note 102, at 263.
Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 99.
Id.
Id.
Pittman, supra note 102, at 1102.
Killian, supra note 100, at 40.
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considered safe, such as asset-backed commercial paper.146 The availability of
credit was severely curtailed and offered only to those with the highest of
credit ratings.147 The impact of this credit crunch extended to everyday
businesses struggling to finance their operations in an environment of reduced
credit.148 Businesses could no longer rely on credit to bridge the timing
differences between receiving payments and incurring the costs necessary to
operate.149
Investment banks struggled to survive after sustaining hundreds of billions
of dollars in losses from mortgage-related activities during 2008.150
Unprecedented events for many investment companies occurred during
September 2008, including companies that had previously seemed impervious
to trouble. For example, Lehman Brothers was unable to continue treading
water and ultimately filed for bankruptcy, and Bank of America purchased
Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.151 The economic hardship was not confined to
investment banks as the overall economy suffered staggering job losses in
2008, a trend that continued into 2009. For example, November 2008 saw the
loss of over five hundred thousand jobs, and over sixty-five thousand jobs were
lost on a single day: January 26, 2009.152
In light of the severity of the economic downturn, the question arises
whether SOX, the controversial legislative response to the last bout of
corporate scandal, functioned adequately to protect investors and the public.
Were the tremendous costs incurred by companies to be in compliance with
SOX in vain, or did SOX minimize the losses the investment banks
incurred?153
III. THE ROLE OF SOX AND INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
SOX focused on the creation of financial statements free from material
misstatement, increased management’s responsibility for financial statements,
and implemented internal controls related to financial reporting. The following

146. Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, System Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU
L. REV. 209, 211–12 (2008) (discussing the reaction of investors to decline in value of mortgagebacked securities).
147. CBO, ADDRESSING THE ONGOING CRISIS IN THE HOUSING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
(2009) (statement of Director Doughlas W. Elmendorf to the Comm. on the Budget, U.S. Senate).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sorkin, supra note 99, at A1.
151. Id.
152. Louis Uchitelle et al., 533,000 Are Cut: Biggest Drop Since ‘74 as the Recession
Accelerates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at A1; Healy, supra note 6.
153. HOLT, supra note 1, at 13. Large multinational companies can spend between $1 and
$10 million and smaller companies can spend between $250,000 and $500,000 for SOX
compliance.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN

289

discussion considers the application of SOX to investment banks in the events
leading to the economic downturn. This section will consider whether
investment banks appropriately identified mortgage-related accounts as
requiring internal controls for financial reporting, whether the mortgage-related
accounts were properly valued in the financial statements, and whether the
financial statement disclosures regarding investment bank’s mortgage-related
activity complied with the SOX mandated disclosures.154
The massive asset write-downs taken by investment banks since 2007
demonstrate that mortgage-related activity had the potential to greatly impact
financial statements.155 As part of the focus on financial reporting and
auditing, SOX requires that both management and the company’s external
auditor assess the company’s internal controls over financial reporting.156
SOX also charged the PCAOB with responsibility for promulgating standards
for the audit of financial statements.157 Thus, the PCAOB pronouncement
addressing the audit of internal controls over financial reporting provides
valuable insight into what SOX intended for management to consider when
establishing and assessing its internal control over financial reporting.158 The
current PCAOB pronouncement for the audit of internal controls over financial
reporting is Auditing Standard No. 5 (“AS 5”) and will be used here to help
identify areas where SOX may have been applicable and therefore play a role
in the financial reporting of investment banks leading up to the mortgage
meltdown.159
The requirement for management to assess its internal controls is provided
for in SOX to afford “reasonable assurance” of the “reliability of financial

154. Some commentators have pinpointed a failure of risk management by investment banks
as a source of the mortgage meltdown and call for disclosure of such practices. See Betty
Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 572–73 (2008); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: What Led to the
Financial Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 26–27.
155. For example, Citibank reported a net loss of $9.83 billion for the fourth quarter of 2007
citing “write-downs on sub-prime related direct exposures” as a catalyst of the net loss. Press
Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Reports Fourth Quarter Net Loss of $9.83 Billion, Loss Per Share of
$1.99 (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/qer074.pdf.
156. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
157. § 101, 116 Stat. at 750.
158. See § 101, 116 Stat. at 750–51.
159. This pronouncement supersedes Auditing Standard No. 2 and is applicable for audits
conducting under Section 404(b) of SOX. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING
STANDARD NO. 5: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS
INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ 1 (2007), available at http://pcao
bus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/Auditing_Standard_5.aspx [hereinafter AUDITING STANDARD
NO. 5].
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reporting and preparation of financial statements.”160 AS 5 indicates the
assessment should address the internal controls that concern accounts and
disclosures that are “significant.”161 Thus, the internal controls of the accounts
and disclosures considered “significant” to the investment bank should have
been assessed by both management and the company’s external auditor. AS 5
also sets out financial statement “assertions” that should be considered when
identifying significant accounts and disclosures.162 The most applicable types
of assertions relative to the discussion here of the mortgage crisis are
“valuation” and “presentation and disclosure.”163 The success of SOX in this
area depends on the identification of the correct “significant” accounts and
disclosures, implementing proper internal controls to address the financial
reporting of these accounts and disclosures, and management properly
assessing the effectiveness of the internal controls.164
A.

Accounts Reflecting Mortgage Activity Trigger the Need for Internal
Controls

Auditing Standard No. 5 identifies several factors to consider in identifying
significant accounts. These factors include the:
Size and composition of account; volume of activity; complexity and
homogeneity of the individual transactions processed through the account;
nature of the account; accounting and reporting complexities associated with
the account; exposure to losses in the account; and possibility of significant
165
contingent liabilities arising from the activities reflected in the account.

Considering these risk factors it seems that the accounts reflecting the
mortgage activities of investment banks should be deemed “significant,”
triggering the requirement for internal controls concerning these accounts.
There was a tremendous volume of subprime lending, as loan originations
reached approximately $625 billion in 2005.166 There were also a remarkable
number of mortgage-backed securities transactions by investment banks,

160. Auditors are also to consider any control deficiencies they identify when conducting the
financial statement audit. Id. ¶ 15.
161. This is to direct attention to the accounts, disclosures and assertions that “present a
reasonable possiblity of material misstatement to the financial statements and related
disclosures.” Id. ¶ 21.
162. Id. ¶ 28.
163. The other financial statement assertions include “existence or occurrence, completeness,
and rights and obligations.” Id.
164. See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 2; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
165. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 29.
166. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 93. The 2005 figure shows the tremendous
growth in subprime loan origination as 2001 had only approximately $120 billion of subprime
loan origination.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN

291

evidenced by the $1.5 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities the top 10
investment banks sold during 2006.167 The variety of mortgages and
securitization schemes underlying these accounts also became increasingly
complex.168 Additionally, the sale of mortgages by investment banks to SPEs
triggered the application of complicated accounting standards and the need to
fund reserves for repurchase agreements in order to stave off the risk of
bankruptcy.169 Further, there was obviously a significant risk of loss
associated with mortgage-related activities, as hundreds of billions in losses
have been triggered by these activities.170 These accounts, therefore, likely
should be been identified as “significant.”
Since mortgage-related accounts should have been identified “significant,”
investment banks should have concluded that these accounts required internal
controls addressing their valuation and disclosure in the financial statements.
Citigroup will be used as an example to illustrate the potential applications of
these aspects of SOX to the role of investment banks in the mortgage
meltdown.171
B.

Internal Control over Valuation

The “valuation” financial statement assertion addresses whether elements
of the financial statement have been appraised or “valued” appropriately.172
Assets recorded in financial statements at fair value have been affected by the
housing and mortgage markets, triggering the need to increase credit losses for
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities.173 The internal controls addressing
the valuation of the accounts that reflect this activity should address the
method of valuation, whether the method’s underlying assumptions are

167. Der Hovanesian, supra note 119, at 70.
168. Prins, supra note 102, at 114.
169. See Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 95–97.
170. Sorkin, supra note 99, at A1.
171. Citigroup has participated widely in the mortgage business and is one of the largest
issuers of subprime mortgages. See Eric Dash, Citigroup Combining Mortgage Operations Into
One Unit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2008, at C2, available at www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/business/
09citi.html?scp=1&sq=citigroup%20combining%20mortgage%20operations%20into%20one%20
unit&st=cse.
172. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU
§ 326.07 (2006) (“Assertions about valuation or allocation address whether asset, liability, equity,
revenue, and expense components have been included in the financial statements at appropriate
amounts. For example, management asserts that property is recorded at historical cost and that
such cost is systematically allocated to appropriate accounting periods. Similarly, management
asserts that trade accounts receivable included in the balance sheet are stated at net realizable
value.”).
173. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., STAFF AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT NO. 2, 1 n.1
(2007), http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/12-10-2007_APA_2.pdf.
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reasonable, and if the method should be altered due to market conditions.174
This could be an area of success or failure for SOX, primarily turning on
whether the internal controls concerning valuation triggered investment banks
to take their mortgage-related write-downs at the proper time. If the writedown of an asset should have been taken earlier than when it was actually
reflected in the financial statements, it would indicate that the prior financial
statements were improperly overvalued.
SOX may not have enhanced investor protection during the mortgage crisis
if investment banks failed to identify the accounts reflecting mortgage activity
as “significant” and, thus, failed to conclude the accounts required internal
controls to address proper valuation.175 If the correct accounts are not
identified as requiring internal controls to address how the activity is recorded
in the financial statements, investors are not provided with information
superior to the information available pre-SOX.
Sox may not have provided increased investor protection if investment
banks correctly implemented the internal controls but incorrectly assessed the
controls as effective.176 For example, one of Citigroup’s write-downs in its
Securities and Banking division for the fourth quarter of 2008 included $4.6
billion for direct subprime related exposure.177 In the fourth quarter of 2007,
Citigroup wrote down $17.4 billion for the same exposure.178 If it is found in
the future that the 2008 write-down should have occurred in 2007 or sooner,
then both the 2008 financial statements and the prior period’s financial
statements would have been improperly valued. This could be considered an
area where SOX was not effective if it is found that though management
conducted the required assessment and determined that the internal controls
were effective, when in actuality the adjustments should have been recorded in
a different period. This would suggest that merely complying with SOX
assessment requirements was not sufficient to provide additional protection to
investors.179
Conversely, SOX may be deemed a success concerning account valuation
if it is determined that the mortgage-related accounts were properly valued and
the write-downs that occurred in 2007 and 2008 were taken in the proper

174. Id. at 4–5.
175. See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 21.
176. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
177. Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Reports Fourth Quarter Net Loss of $8.29 Billion,
Loss Per Share of $1.72 (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/qer084.pdf.
178. Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Reports Fourth Quarter Net Loss of $9.83 Billion,
Loss Per Share of $1.99 (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/qer074.pdf.
179. The purpose of SOX is “[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability
of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .” Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116
Stat. at 745.
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period.180 This would constitute a SOX success because proper valuation
would be indicative of management’s implementation of internal controls that
facilitated the bank’s identification of the write-downs’ proper timing and
application of accounting standards.181
As further investigation into the mortgage crisis is conducted, it will be
possible to more definitively assess whether the SOX provisions addressing
internal controls and their application to valuation were successful. It is,
however, possible at this time to identify that there were opportunities for the
application of SOX concerning the valuation of mortgage-related activities.
C. SOX Disclosure Requirements
Section 401 though Section 409 of SOX are dedicated to “enhanced
financial disclosures” and include specific guidelines that address the
disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions, management’s assessment of
internal controls, pro forma information, the use of a code of ethics, and the
presence of a financial expert on the Audit Committee.182 Additionally, via AS
5, there should be a component of the internal control framework tailored to
address the disclosures comprising the financial statements and whether they
are “properly classified, described, and disclosed.”183
1. Investment Bank’s Use of Off-Balance Sheet Transactions Trigger
SOX Provisions
As mentioned in Part III.A.2, an SPE is a type of off-balance sheet
arrangement that can be used by lenders as part of the mortgage securitization
process.184 Section 401 requires a company to disclose material “off-balance
sheet transactions”185 in the Management Discussion and Analysis of the
annual and quarterly reports.186 The disclosure is intended to provide investors
with enhanced transparency by including discussion to address the nature of
the relationship, the importance of the transactions to liquidity, the nature of

180. See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 28; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB;
ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 172, at AU § 326.07.
181. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 28.
182. §§ 401–09, 116 Stat. at 785–91; AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, ¶ 28.
183. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5, supra note 159, at ¶ 28. Examples of the application of the
disclosure assertion include “management asserts that obligations classified as long-term
liabilities in the balance sheet will not mature within one year. Similarly, management asserts
that amounts presented as extraordinary items in the income statement are properly classified and
described.” AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 172, at AU § 326.08.
184. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 107, at 96.
185. § 401,116 Stat. at 786.
186. Bost, supra note 19, at 37.
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any interests retained by the company, and any known events of uncertainty
that are likely to reduce the benefit of the SPE to the company.187
While it is to be expected that the 2008 annual reports of investment banks
will include significant disclosures related to the off-balance sheet
arrangements that contributed to the losses recorded during 2008, one might
also expect for there to have been similar disclosures prior to the losses that
were ultimately recorded. SPE transactions were one of the principal triggers
of Enron’s downfall, and its investors were not properly or sufficiently
informed of the degree of risk Enron was exposed to by them.188 The spirit of
SOX would seem to call for providing investors with disclosure before the
investor suffers declining share value from losses stemming from these risks.
Investment banks began writing-down assets related to mortgage activities
in October 2007.189 This renders the 2006 annual report of an investment bank
of particular interest to the analysis here. Comparison of Citigroup’s 2006 and
2007 annual reports will therefore be used to highlight the application of SOX
to the mortgage meltdown.
In 2006, Citigroup allocated two pages of its annual report discussion
under the heading “Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements.”190 The discussion
stated that Citigroup was involved with various off-balance sheet arrangements
that included SPEs, some of which were variable interest entities (“VIEs”)
requiring financial support from third parties.191 Citigroup stated that it did not
consolidate most of these VIEs into its financial statements because Citigroup
was not the primary beneficiary of the VIEs.192 Citigroup did note that some
of these arrangements concerned the securitization of assets, including
mortgage loan securitizations, and that those arrangements had previously been
recorded on its consolidated balance sheet.193 Additionally, Citigroup noted
that it securitized a wide range of mortgage products to reduce credit exposure
“effectively transferring the risk of future credit losses to the purchasers of the
securities issued.”194
There is also a reference within the off-balance sheet discussion directing
readers to an additional note for further discussion. This note included a table
187. Id.
188. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 14–15.
189. For example, Citigroup announced for the first time in October that its net income would
decline for the third quarter of 2007 from “dislocations in the mortgage-backed securities and
credit markets.” Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Expects Substantial Decline in Third Quarter
Net Income (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/071001a.pdf.
190. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 92–93 (Feb. 23, 2007).
191. Id. at 92. Citigroup defines a VIE as “type of SPE that does not have sufficient equity to
finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support from third parties.”
192. Id.
193. Id. The discussion includes a reference to another footnote for further discussion of cash
flows received and paid in relation to the securitizations.
194. Id. at 93.
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describing the assets of unconsolidated VIEs and company’s expectation that
actual losses related to unconsolidated VIEs will not be material, with an
estimated maximum exposure from unconsolidated VIEs of $109 billion for
2006.195 Though there was discussion of the company’s estimated maximum
exposure, arguably investors would have had to search for the information, as
it was not included in the discussion under the heading “Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements.” Readers had to refer to a separate note, and the information
was presented several pages into the referenced note.
Citigroup significantly increased the number of pages and discussion under
the heading “Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements” in 2007. The pages increased
to twelve and increased the discussion of Citigroup’s VIE exposures and the
difficulties surrounding the decision whether to consolidate them in the
financial statements.196 The expanded discussion included the standard for
determining whether a VIE is reported on a consolidated basis in the financial
statements, “based on expected loss and residual returns” from those scenarios
most likely to occur.197 Citigroup commented on the difficulty in ascertaining
whether the extent of its involvement with the VIEs rendered it a primary
beneficiary (based on “significant involvement”) and the factors to consider in
making the assessment.198
Citigroup made a significant adjustment in its disclosure in 2007 by
altering its definition of “significant involvement” to include all variable
interests, including those interests where the likelihood of loss was considered
small.199 This triggered VIEs previously considered insignificant to be
reclassified to significant.200
Citigroup’s rationale for the expanded
designation of significant VIEs was to provide “more meaningful and
consistent information regarding its involvement in various VIE structures
and . . . more data for an independent assessment of the potential risks the
Company’s involvement in various VIEs and asset classes.”201
This reclassification had a tremendous impact of the 2006 unconsolidated
“significant” VIEs, which increased from $227.8 billion in 2006202 to $388.3
billion when reclassified in 2007.203 Another potential source of surprise for
investors in 2007 was the $58.5 billion dollars of additional liability reported
on the consolidated balance sheet in 2007 after Citigroup became the primary

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007).
See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 85–96 (Feb. 22, 2008).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 86 (Feb. 22, 2008).
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007).
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 87 (Feb. 22, 2008).
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beneficiary of its structured investment vehicles (SIVs), a type of SPE.204 The
only specific reference to SIVs in Citigroup’s 2006 Annual Report was
embedded as a line item within a table presenting SPE assets and was not
included under the heading “Off Balance Sheet Arrangements”.205
As SOX specifically addressed off-balance sheet relationships in its
provisions, it certainly had a role to play in the period leading up to the current
economic turmoil because much of the losses sustained by the investment
banks were triggered by off-balance sheet relationships.206 Whether the
disclosures concerning the investment bank’s off-balance sheet arrangements
were SOX compliant will likely be addressed in the future through shareholder
litigation.
Presumably, investment bank investors should have been in a better
position than Enron investors to assess the risk posed by off-balance sheet
arrangements since SOX attempted to enhance these disclosures in response to
the outrage of Enron’s investors to its hidden off-balance sheet risk
exposure.207 However, similar to the shock felt by Enron investors when the
risks of its off-balance sheet relationships were revealed, investors of
investment banks are currently expressing shock at the magnitude of risk
investment banks undertook and ultimately passed on to its investors.208 With
Enron, the disclosure of the extent of its risky off-balance sheet relationships
was revealed after the damage to the company had already been inflicted.209
Here, while there was increased disclosure in 2007 preceding the tremendous
write-downs during 2008, there was minimal disclosure of off-balance sheet
risk exposure prior to the write-downs taken during 2007. This may be found
to have denied investors the opportunity to adequately assess the risk
investment banks faced from off-balance sheet arrangements and, thus, could
be considered a failure of SOX.
If the disclosures are found to be lacking, this may also indicate a failure of
the internal controls intended to address the adequacy of financial statement
disclosures. Future investigations will likely shed further light on whether the
investment banks’ disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements was
inadequate, whether investors gave inadequate attention to the disclosures that
were presented, or a combination of both.

204. Id. at 94. In 2007 Citigroup became a primary beneficiary of structured investment
vehicles, by committing to support the SIVs senior debt rating. The rating of the debt had been
downgraded and continued liquidity issues prompted Citigroup to make the commitment,
resulting in consolidation of the SIV on Citigroup’s balance sheet.
205. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 146 (Feb. 23, 2007).
206. McLean, supra note 50, at 76.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. See supra Part II.B.
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2. Investment Bank’s Use of Pro Forma Data Regarding Capital
Requirements Trigger SOX Provisions
SOX also addressed the presentation of disclosures related to pro forma
data. Section 401 calls for pro forma data to be presented in a manner that is
free from untrue material facts and free from omissions of material facts
necessary to make the pro forma data not misleading.210 While in 2006,
Citigroup did not present pro forma mortgage-related data,211 its 2007 Annual
Report presented pro forma capital ratios incorporating the effect of
Citigroup’s actions to increase its capital base during the fourth quarter of 2007
and beginning of 2008.212 SOX calls for assessing whether this presentation of
pro forma capital ratios was free from untrue material facts and whether any
material facts necessary to make them not misleading were omitted when
Citigroup indicated that the pro forma capital ratios would have exceeded
management’s targets.213 The discussion presented did not directly discuss any
perceived concerns about future needs to further increase Citigroup’s capital
base.214
The absence of discussion of future capital needs may be considered a
violation of SOX if the absence constituted a failure to include material facts
necessary to prevent the data from being misleading. This is a possibility
considering the extensive strides Citigroup took to raise capital during 2008.
Citigroup made a $4.5 billion common stock offer on April 30, 2008, with the
intent of “improving the balance sheet.”215 More notably, Citigroup issued $25
billion of perpetual preferred stock to the U.S. Treasury as part of the TARP
Capital Purchase Program on December 31, 2008.216 These actions could be
considered indicative of the serious problem capital requirements posed for
Citigroup during 2008. Further investigation will likely reveal whether
Citigroup should have known of this potential problem at the time it made its
pro forma disclosures in the 2007 Annual Report.

210. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401, 116 Stat. 745, 785–87
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
211. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 115 (Feb. 23, 2007).
212. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76 (Feb. 22, 2008). The Company raised
over $30 billion to increase its capital base and on a pro forma basis would have increased several
of its capital ratios.
213. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785–87; Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76 (Feb. 22,
2008).
214. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76–77 (Feb. 22, 2008).
215. Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Prices $4.5 Billion Common Stock Offering (Apr. 30,
2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2008/080430a.htm.
216. Citigroup released its first progress report of the use of its TARP funds in February
2009. Press Release, Citigroup Inc. Citi Issues First Quarterly Progress Report on Its Use of
TARP Capital (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090203
a.htm.
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3. Disclosure of Code of Ethics and Audit Committee Financial Expert
Did Not Prevent Losses
SOX also required the company to disclose whether it has a code of ethics
and whether the audit committee has a financial expert.217 While these
enhanced disclosure requirements arguably provide investors with important
information concerning general corporate governance, these likely played less
of a role in the context of the mortgage-related risks. Citigroup indicated in
both its 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports that it has a company-wide Code of
Conduct that is supplemented by a Code of Ethics for Financial
Professionals.218 Citigroup also directed readers to its website for additional
information concerning its corporate governance. The Audit and Risk
Management Committee Charter indicated that its membership included at
least one member that qualified as an audit committee financial expert.219
While these additional disclosure requirements provide some insight into a
company’s corporate governance practices, the generality of these disclosures
likely did little to shed light for investors on the tremendous mortgage-related
risks the investment banks were facing. In the context of these disclosures,
investors may be more informed by the absence of a code of ethics or financial
expert on the audit committee. A company’s failure to maintain a code of
ethics or include a financial expert on its audit committee would provide a
warning to a potential investor about the company’s corporate governance
when deciding whether to invest. In the context of Citigroup, compliance with
these SOX requirements did not prevent staggering losses, but perhaps their
utilization indirectly mitigated the degree of losses sustained.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States entered a recession in 2007, millions of people lost their
jobs, many homes entered foreclosure, and investment banks took billions of
dollars in losses.220 Investment banks played a significant role in the
popularization of subprime lending and growth in mortgage securitization.
The losses incurred by investment banks refresh the public’s memory of
Enron’s collapse that propelled the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law. As SOX
focused on protecting investors through reliable and accurate financial

217. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 406–07, 116 Stat. at 789–790.
218. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 96 (Feb. 23, 2007). Financial
professionals include positions concerning “finance, accounting, treasury, tax and investor
relations.” Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 97 (Feb. 23, 2007).
219. Citigroup Inc., Audit and Risk Management Committee Charter, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/data/auditriskcharter.pdf?ieNo
cache=809.
220. See discussion supra Part I.
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disclosures, the question arises whether SOX had a role to play in protecting
investors of investment banks from the current crisis.
It is clear there are SOX provisions applicable to the mortgage-related
activity of investment banks. SOX charged management of investment banks
with responsibility for establishing internal control systems to address financial
reporting for “significant” accounts.221 Given the tremendous volume and
complexity of investment banks mortgage-related transactions, these accounts
should likely be considered “significant.”222 As a result, investment banks
should have instituted controls to address the valuation and disclosure of
mortgage-related activity in the financial statements.223 Of particular concern
is whether the disclosure of off-balance sheet relationships used by investment
banks for mortgage activities were sufficiently disclosed prior to investment
banks’ recorded losses.224 A further concern is whether disclosure of pro
forma data for capital requirements made prior to the significant capital raising
activities during 2008 were sufficient to not be misleading.225 While SOX
triggered disclosures regarding the existence of a code of ethics and the
presence of financial experts on the audit committee, these disclosures likely
did not provide information sufficiently specific to alert investors to the
mortgage-related risks investment banks incurred.226
Further investigation is necessary to assess whether the investment bank’s
financial statements violated SOX. If investment banks were compliant, this
may suggest that SOX is not effectively carrying out its purpose of enhancing
protection for investors. As the broad reach of the economic recession has
demonstrated, answering these questions is imperative to ascertain what reform
measures should be taken to protect not only investors, but the general public
as well.
ELISA C. CLARK

221. See discussion supra Part III.
222. See discussion supra Part III.A.
223. See discussion supra Part III.A.
224. See discussion supra Part III. B.
225. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
226. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
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